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THE NOT-SO-STEALTHY REVOLUTION IN PERSONAL
JURISDICTION
A RESPONSE TO MICHAEL HOFFHEIMER
Judy M. Cornett*
With elegant style and in devastating detail, Professor Michael
Hoffheimer has analyzed the slow death spiral of personal jurisdiction
under the Roberts Court.1 He accurately identifies one source of the
frustration scholars and lower courts have felt in trying to make sense of
the Roberts Court’s personal jurisdiction jurisprudence: the Court
purports to be applying settled law while simultaneously unsettling wellestablished principles.2 Professor Hoffheimer perspicaciously describes
how this sleight of hand both leads to and masks the Court’s failure “to
offer a clear rule of decision,” its failure “to explain the policies that
motivate its changing approach to personal jurisdiction,” and its
implication that the lower courts are sloppily ignoring settled law when,
in fact, they are struggling to apply the Court’s newly adopted personal
jurisdiction principles.3 In the course of his analysis, Professor
Hoffheimer displays a mastery of the history and current contours of
personal jurisdiction as he urges the Court to “acknowledge” that it is
recasting the law of personal jurisdiction, to “provide reasons” for its
new, wildly restrictive agenda, and to “construct a narrative” that would
explain why these new restrictions are required by the Due Process
Clause or “some other appropriate constitutional authority.”4
There are many stories that can be told about this line of six post-2011
personal jurisdiction cases.5 Professor Hoffheimer has chosen a
jurisprudential story, and he has chosen to focus on only one of the six
decisions, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court.6 Here, I want to
tell, briefly, three more stories about the slow-motion disaster we are
witnessing, and focus on another one of the six cases—Daimler AG v.
* College of Law Distinguished Professor, University of Tennessee College of Law. I
would like to thank the editors of the Florida Law Review for the invitation to respond to Professor
Hoffheimer’s article. I am grateful to Professors Michael Hoffheimer and Valorie Vojdik for
helpful comments on an earlier draft. I would also like to thank Tate Ball, UT Law class of 2019,
and Heather Bosau and Gavin Smelcer, UT Law class of 2020, for outstanding research assistance.
1. Michael H. Hoffheimer, The Stealth Revolution in Personal Jurisdiction, 70 FLA. L.
REV. 499 (2018).
2. Id. at 552.
3. Id. at 499.
4. Id. at 552.
5. The six post-2011 cases are, in chronological order: J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro,
564 U.S. 873 (2011); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011);
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014); Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277 (2014); BNSF Ry.
Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017); and Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S.
Ct. 1773 (2017).
6. 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017).
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Bauman7—which, in my view, is the poisoned well from which the four
later decisions flow.8
The first story is the undue solicitude for corporations. Professor
Hoffheimer alludes to the fact that in five of the six Roberts Court cases,
large corporations triumphed over individual plaintiffs.9 But he does not
nail down the larger implications of this observation. As Justice
Sotomayor noted in her concurrence in Daimler, it seems that
corporations can be both “too big to fail” and “too big to sue.”10
Corporations have become, not just people, but favorites of American
law. The Court in Daimler worried, with no factual basis, that the
“continuous and systematic contacts” test did not allow corporations to
predict with certainty where they would be subject to suit.11 In fact, this
is the only policy reason given by the Court for upending the settled law
of general jurisdiction.
Yet, examination of cases decided by both the Supreme Court and the
lower courts in the years between Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining
Co.12 and Daimler shows that corporations were doing a pretty good job
of figuring out when their contacts with a state were “continuous and
systematic” enough to yield general jurisdiction. As Professor
Hoffheimer points out, the manufacturer and nationwide importer in
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson13 and the parent corporation
in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations S.A. v. Brown14 did not contest
personal jurisdiction in Oklahoma and North Carolina, respectively, but
would not now be subject to general jurisdiction in those states.15 Even
the author of Daimler, Justice Ginsburg, noted in J. McIntyre Machinery,
Ltd. v. Nicastro16 that “the foreign manufacturer of the Audi in WorldWide Volkswagen did not object to the jurisdiction of the Oklahoma
courts and the U.S. importer abandoned its initially stated objection. And
most relevant here, the Court's opinion indicates that an objection to
jurisdiction by the manufacturer or national distributor would have been
7. 571 U.S. 117 (2014).
8. For example, the California court in Bristol-Myers Squibb could have, prior to Daimler,
exercised general jurisdiction over the pharmaceutical company with respect to the non-forum
plaintiffs’ claims. The court would not have been forced to consider specific jurisdiction over the
non-forum plaintiffs’ claims in Bristol-Myers Squibb if the Supreme Court had not eviscerated
general jurisdiction in Daimler.
9. Hoffheimer, supra note 1, at 548.
10. Justice Sotomayor actually referred to the defendant here as “too big for general
jurisdiction.” Daimler, 571 U.S. at 143 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment).
11. Id. at 138–39.
12. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
13. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
14. 564 U.S. 915 (2011).
15. Hoffheimer, supra note 1, at 502.
16. 564 U.S. 873 (2011).
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unavailing.”17 If Justice Ginsburg is here referring to specific jurisdiction,
the Court’s holding in Walden v. Fiore18 would change this result, and if
she is referring to general jurisdiction, she herself authored the opinion in
Daimler that changes the result. At oral argument in Daimler, Justice
Kagan asked whether the plaintiff’s position would make Daimler subject
to suit in all 50 states, and when counsel answered that it would, she
responded, “[T]hat has got to be wrong.”19 But thanks to the Court’s
decision in that case, Walmart, the largest retailer in the world, appears
to be subject to jurisdiction for any claim in only three states: Delaware,
its state of incorporation; Arkansas, where it has its principal place of
business; and whatever state the cause of action “arises in or is related
to.”
As Professor Hoffheimer notes, this result is only reinforced by the
Court’s analysis in Bristol-Myers Squibb. The Court’s insistence that the
reasonableness inquiry must privilege the “burden on the defendant”
above all other interests goes unexplained.20 Although Justice Alito states
that the burden must be evaluated in practical terms, this is not what the
Court actually does. It seems more absurd for a corporation like Walmart
to be amenable to jurisdiction in only three states than to subject it to
general jurisdiction in all 50 states. It seems, in fact, that the Court is not
so much concerned with the “burden” on the defendant as with the
inconvenience of the forum generally. Even positing a worst case
scenario in which an injury is caused by Walmart in South Florida and
the plaintiff sues in northern Alaska, where the defendant’s contacts do
not relate to the cause of action, the real concern is not the burden on
Walmart—which surely has the wherewithal to defend itself in the
furthest reaches of the U.S.—but rather the inconvenience of litigating a
claim in Alaska where witnesses and evidence are probably in Florida
and where Florida jurors, rather than Alaskans, would be more willing to
serve as jurors. If this is right, then the defense of forum non conveniens
adequately protects Walmart from having to try a case in Alaska that
arose in Florida. There is no need for the undue solicitude of a
constitutional doctrine to protect the nation’s largest retailer.21
As predicted by Justice Sotomayor in her concurrence, this result has
had two deleterious effects.22 First, it has sent scholars and plaintiffs
scrambling to find alternative bases for the assertion of general
17. Id. at 907 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
18. 571 U.S. 277 (2014).
19. Transcript of Oral Argument at 31, Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014)
(No.11-965).
20. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017).
21. Justice Sotomayor makes this point in her concurrence in Daimler. See Daimler, 571
U.S. at 156 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment).
22. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 142–60 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment).
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jurisdiction over corporations. The two most popular are (1) broadening
specific jurisdiction by an expansive definition of where a cause of action
“arises” or “relates to” and (2) an argument that a corporation’s
registration to do business in a state and appointment of a registered agent
for service of process constitutes consent to general jurisdiction.23 A third
alternative, the “exceptional case” caveat Justice Ginsburg wrote into the
Daimler decision, appears to be a dead letter.24
Second, Daimler has sent the lower courts into a tailspin of
uncertainty. Take, for example, Erwin v. Ford Motor Co.,25 in which a
widower filed a products liability suit against Ford, alleging that a
defective airbag caused the death of his wife when her 2010 Ford Escape
was involved in a crash. The suit was filed in the federal district
encompassing the location of the crash, Hillsborough County, Florida.26
This should be an easy case: there should be specific jurisdiction because
the crash occurred in the district, and there should be general jurisdiction
because Ford Motor Company has “continuous and systematic” contacts
with Florida, including these undisputed contacts: “Ford maintains at
least 110 Ford dealerships in Florida, sends thousands of vehicles to
Florida each year to be sold in Florida, maintains an agent for service of
legal process in Florida, and maintains a Regional Headquarters in
Maitland, Florida.”27
But the district court granted Ford’s motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction.28 There was no general jurisdiction over Ford
because it is incorporated in Delaware and has its principal place of
business in Michigan; this was not an “exceptional case” under Daimler
because Ford’s proportional contacts in Florida did not render it “at
home” there.29 There was no specific jurisdiction over Ford because “the
2010 Ford Edge at issue was not designed in Florida, was not originally
sold by Ford in Florida or to a customer in Florida, and . . . the 2010 Ford
Edge entered Florida without Ford's involvement.”30 Therefore, the claim
did not arise out of or relate to Ford’s contacts with Florida.31 Where can
23. See, e.g., Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Toward a New
Equilibrium in Personal Jurisdiction, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 207, 231, 260 (2014).
24. A survey of more than 400 post-Daimler cases discloses that in only two did the district
court explicitly find an “exceptional case” for general jurisdiction under Daimler. See Sokolow v.
PLO, 2014 WL 6811395, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2014), rev’d sub nom. Waldman v. PLO, 835
F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 2016); Hendricks v. New Video Channel America, LLC, 2015 WL 3616983, at
*3 (C.D. Cal. June 8, 2015).
25. 2016 WL 7655398 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 31, 2016).
26. Id.
27. Id. at *2.
28. Id. at *13.
29. Id. at *12.
30. Id. at *2.
31. Id. at *7.
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the plaintiff sue? Delaware or Michigan, and because the car was sold to
plaintiff in Ohio, presumably in Ohio, or perhaps in Ontario, Canada,
where the car was assembled.32 But because of Daimler, Ford Motor
Company, unlike Volkswagen in World-Wide, cannot be sued in Florida
on a products liability claim arising from an automobile accident that
happened in Florida.33
As illustrated by Erwin and noted by Professor Hoffheimer, “the costs
to the plaintiff are real.”34 But personal jurisdiction is just one aspect of
the diminishing access to justice resulting from the Court’s recent civil
procedure jurisprudence. In a short but descriptively titled article, Don’t
Look Now, But the Doors to the Federal Courthouse Are Closing,35
Professor Arthur Miller surveyed the obstacles to litigation placed in the
path of plaintiffs, beginning with the 1986 summary judgment trilogy,
and continuing with Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,36 AT&T Mobility v.
Conception,37 and Twombly/Iqbal.38 Professor Miller ended his analysis
with J. McIntyre, contending that the plurality opinion “redefined the
constitutional limits on personal jurisdiction,”39 and concluding more
generally, “[a] majority of the justices seem singularly concerned about
the litigation burdens on corporations and governmental officials.”40
Professor Miller’s conclusion has been amply vindicated by the five cases
that succeeded J. McIntyre, particularly Daimler. And these cases take
their place alongside Atlantic Marine Construction Co. v. U.S. District
Court41 and Kindred Nursing Centers Ltd. Partnership v. Clark,42 both of
which erect new barriers to plaintiffs’ access to the civil justice system.
A final perspective on these six Roberts Court cases is the intra-Court
32. See id. at *2.
33. The district court granted the plaintiff’s motion to transfer the case to the District of
Delaware. Erwin v. Ford Motor Co., 2016 WL 9525590, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 27, 2016). It is
unclear how the litigation of a Florida car wreck in Delaware serves the interests of anyone other
than Ford, and maybe not even Ford, if their proof involves more than mere document production.
Cf. J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 899 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(“Indeed, among States of the United States, the State in which the injury occurred would seem
most suitable for litigation of a products liability tort claim.”).
34. Hoffheimer, supra note 1, at 550.
35. Arthur R. Miller, Don’t Look Now, But the Doors to the Federal Courthouse Are
Closing,
LAW
SCH.:
MAG.
N.Y.U.
65
(2012),
http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/NYU_Law_Magazine_2012.pdf
[https://perma.cc/49QX-NNCE].
36. 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
37. 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
38. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007).
39. Miller, supra note 35, at 67.
40. Id. at 68.
41. 571 U.S. 49 (2013).
42. 137 S. Ct. 1421 (2017).
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dynamic revealed in this seven-year sequence of decisions. How did the
coalition of the three female justices, who dissented in J. McIntyre,
fracture so badly that two of the justices who opposed the discourse of
state sovereignty and power there ended up supporting that very discourse
in Bristol-Myers Squibb? In J. McIntyre, Justice Kennedy framed
personal jurisdiction as a matter of “the power of a sovereign” and a
defendant’s “intention to submit to the power of a sovereign.”43 This
discourse—jarringly different from the discourse of fairness initiated by
International Shoe—drew a rebuke from Justice Ginsburg, writing for
herself and Justices Kagan and Sotomayor: “I take heart that the plurality
opinion does not speak for the Court, for that opinion would take a giant
step away from the ‘notions of fair play and substantial justice’
underlying International Shoe.”44
Yet, despite this stated commitment to fairness as the touchstone for
personal jurisdiction, Justice Ginsburg wrote an opinion in Daimler that
adopts an ultra-formalistic test for general jurisdiction.45 Justice Ginsburg
asserts in her J. McIntyre dissent that “the Court has made plain that legal
fictions, notably ‘presence’ and ‘implied consent,’ should be discarded,
for they conceal the actual bases on which jurisdiction rests,”46 but she
and Justice Kagan agreed in Daimler that the basis for general jurisdiction
over corporations should be the legal fiction of the corporation’s
“domicile.”47 The third member of the J. McIntyre dissenting coalition,
Justice Sotomayor, concurred in Daimler that California lacked personal
jurisdiction over the German corporation on reasonableness grounds.48
But she disagreed with the majority’s new test for general jurisdiction.49
She predicted a number of practical problems that would result from
Daimler, and she has been proven right in Bristol-Myers Squibb.
It is clear that neither Justice Ginsburg, an iconic hero of women’s
rights, nor Justice Kagan, a liberal ex-Dean of Harvard Law School, is a
class warrior. Despite Justice Sotomayor’s warnings, neither seems to
have grasped the deleterious effect that Daimler would have on the little

43. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 882 (2011).
44. Id. at 910 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
45. Although the Court purportedly adopted the “at home” test, that test implies factual
analysis, which is not required. Factual analysis is required only when the “exceptional case”
exception is invoked. The real test for general jurisdiction involves only identification of the states
of incorporation and principal place of business, not analysis of facts regarding the defendant’s
relationship with the forum state.
46. J. McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 899 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
47. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 517 U.S. 117, 137 (2014).
48. Id. at 142.
49. Id.
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guy.50 If we look for differences in the three women’s backgrounds that
might explain why Justice Sotomayor appreciates the impact of personal
jurisdiction doctrine on individual plaintiffs, we find remarkable
similarities. All three were born in New York City, albeit in three
different boroughs: Ginsburg, in Brooklyn; Kagan, in Manhattan; and
Sotomayor, in the Bronx.51 All three earned both undergraduate and law
degrees from Ivy League institutions—Ginsburg, from Cornell and
Columbia; Kagan, from Princeton and Harvard; and Sotomayor, from
Princeton and Yale.52 But after law school graduation, we see Justice
Sotomayor taking a different path from the others.
Both Ginsburg and Kagan embarked upon clerkships with federal
judges: Ginsburg, with Southern District of New York Judge Edmund L.
Palmieri; and Kagan, with D.C. Circuit Judge Abner Mikva and then
Justice Thurgood Marshall.53 After her clerkship, Justice Ginsburg
moved directly into academia, first at Columbia, then at Rutgers, and
finally back to Columbia before moving to the ACLU.54 At the ACLU,
Ginsburg engaged in appellate practice, arguing six cases before the U.S.
Supreme Court.55 Justice Kagan practiced law for about two years at a
Washington, D.C. firm before entering academia, first at the University
of Chicago and then at Harvard Law School, where she served as Dean
for five years.56 Justice Ginsburg moved directly from the ACLU to a seat
on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, while Justice Kagan
left Harvard Law School to become Solicitor General in the Obama
Administration.57 In that role, she, too, argued six cases before the
Supreme Court.58 Thus, when they ascended to the Supreme Court, both
Ginsburg and Kagan had little or no experience in the trenches of law
practice. Both went directly from elite law schools to law school
professorships to high-level appellate practices (and, in Ginsburg’s case,
to a federal court of appeals) before ascending to the Supreme Court.
50. In J. McIntyre, Justices Breyer and Alito worried about requiring the the Appalachian
potter to defend in distant forums, but in Daimler, they were willing to impose that same burden
on individual plaintiffs in order to vindicate the abstract burden on large corporate defendants.
51. Current
Members,
SUPREME
COURT
OF
THE
UNITED
STATES,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies [https://perma.cc/H83U-94DE] (last visited
Feb. 6, 2019).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/justices/ruth_bader_ginsburg
[https://perma.cc/CY4V-764A] (last visited Feb. 18, 2019).
56. During her time in academia, Justice Kagan took time off to serve as Associate White
House Counsel and Deputy Assistant Director for Domestic Policy in the Clinton White House.
Current Members, supra note 51.
57. Id.
58. Elena
Kagan,
OYEZ,
https://www.oyez.org/justices/elena_kagan
[https://perma.cc/9ZH5-65BB] (last visited Feb. 18, 2019).
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In contrast, upon her graduation from law school, Justice Sotomayor
became an assistant district attorney in the New York District Attorney’s
office, where she prosecuted all sorts of crime, from prostitution to child
pornography to murder.59 She stayed in that position for five years and
had a short-lived solo practice before joining Pavia and Harcourt in
Manhattan as an associate.60 During her eight years there, she specialized
in civil litigation and arbitration in the fields of intellectual property and
international law.61 In 1992, she became a judge on the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York, where she served for six
years before ascending to the Second Circuit in 1998.62 In fact, Justice
Sotomayor is the only sitting Justice who has served as a District Court
judge.63
It is undoubtedly her experience as a civil litigator and a trial judge,
even more than her Puerto Rican heritage or her childhood residency in
public housing, that has enabled Justice Sotomayor to predict the negative
effects of the Court’s recent personal jurisdiction decisions. Just as she
saw that it was unfair to require the plaintiff in J. McIntyre to go to
England to sue the manufacturer,64 so she foresaw that Daimler would
force plaintiffs like Erwin into inconvenient forums and would deprive
some plaintiffs of any forum at all.65 If experience as a civil litigator and
trial court judge is necessary for Supreme Court justices to appreciate the
practical effects of their rulings, then we need to revise the qualifications
for elevation to the Court. Looking for Circuit Court judges who have
also served as District Judges might be a wise course if we wish to avoid,
or remedy, precedents like Daimler that have disastrous ripple effects.
Professor Hoffheimer has done a great service by pointing out the
jurisprudential deficiencies in the Roberts Court’s personal jurisdiction
decisions. Focusing on Bristol-Myers Squibb, he has effectively
demonstrated the threats posed by these decisions, including the potential
destruction of the liberal joinder rules of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. As we continue to see the Daimler dominoes fall, we can only
hope that Justice Sotomayor’s practical, prescient arguments begin to
sway her colleagues.

59. SONIA SOTOMAYOR, MY BELOVED WORLD 240–50 (2013).
60. Id. at 258–60.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 293.
63. Current Members, supra note 51.
64. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 904 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
65. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 517 U.S. 117, 159 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the
judgment).

Electroniccopy
copyavailable
available at:
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3436957
Electronic
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3436957

